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NON-DEBTOR LIABILITY IN CHAPTER 11: VALIDITY OF
THIRD-PARTY DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
PETER M. BOYLE
INTRODUCTION
In response to the recent explosion in the number of bankruptcy fil-
ings, creditors are increasingly seeking protection from debtor insolvency
by securing guarantors and co-obligors. A creditor's reliance on such
guaranties may be frustrated, however, when a bankruptcy court exer-
cises jurisdiction over a third-party guarantor or obligor-referred to in
this context as the non-debtor-and releases that non-debtor from liabil-
ity.1 Discharges of non-debtors in bankruptcy proceedings have implica-
tions not only in the realm of guarantors and co-obligors but also in
many other areas such as cases involving joint tortfeasor liability when
liability is shared by a bankrupt entity and a non-debtor. Indeed,
"[e]liminating [non-debtor] personal liability through confirmation of
corporate plans of reorganization... tends to undermine the policy con-
siderations underlying joint and several liability." 2
Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 (the
"Bankruptcy Code" or "Code") provides that the discharge of a debtor
in bankruptcy does not affect the liability of any other party.4 Accord-
ingly, courts have unanimously held that where a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization is silent on a non-debtor's liability, section 524(e) applies
1. See Richard N. Tilton & Brian D. Wild, Protecting Co-Obligors And Non-Debtor
Guarantors, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 14, 1991, at 5. Non-debtors in the bankruptcy context in-
clude but are not limited to guarantors of the debtor, the debtor's insurer, partners in a
debtor partnership, see Michael L. Cook & Stanley D. Brenner, Third-Party Releases in
Chapter 11 Reorganization Plans, 611 PLI/Corp. 369 (1992), available in, Westlaw, TP-
ALLREV database, at *I (PLI Order No. A4-4374), and parties that may be joint and
severally liable along with the debtor, see eg., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H.
Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 700 (4th Cir.) (non-debtors included several parties that
shared joint tortfeasor liability with the debtor), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
2. Objection of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Confirmation of the
Debtor's Plan of Reorganization Unless a Plan Provision Which Purports to Release
Non-Debtor Third Parties is Deleted from the Plan at 7, In re The Southland Corp., 124
B.R. 211 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (No. 390-37119-HCA-11) [hereinafter SEC Briefl (ci-
tation omitted) (amicus brief of SEC).
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codi-
fied as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code]. The
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 became effiective for petitions filed after October 1, 1979. See
Kenneth M. Cushman & J. Gregg Miller, Effect of the New Bankruptcy Law on
Traditional Surety Rights, 16 Forum 1011 (1980-1981). The Bankruptcy Code replaced
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended. See Grady L. Pettigrew, Jr., Federal Bank-
ruptcy Code: Theory into Practice 1 (1982).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988). A discharge in bankruptcy is the release of the
debtor from its debts. See Black's Law Dictionary 463 (6th ed. 1990). Section 524,
applicable to all cases under Chapter 7, 11, 12 and 13 of the Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(1988), governs the affect of discharges in a Chapter 11 proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 524
(1988).
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to bar the discharge of the non-debtor.5 Where the plan purports to re-
lease a non-debtor from liability, however, the courts have differed on the
validity of such a plan.6 Determining the validity of Chapter 11 plans of
reorganization calling for third-party discharges is significant because a
plan of reorganization may only be confirmed if it complies with all ap-
plicable provisions of the Code.7
While section 524(e) restricts discharges of non-debtors, section
105(a)8 of the Code vests the bankruptcy courts with broad equitable
powers.9 Pursuant to its equitable powers, a bankruptcy court may take
any action "necessary or appropriate" to effect the provisions of the
Code."0 Courts have invoked their section 105(a) equitable powers to
issue permanent injunctions thereby releasing non-debtors from liabil-
ity."I Permanently enjoining third parties, however, runs contrary to the
mandate of section 524(e).
The respective applications of section 105(a) or section 524(e) to non-
debtor discharges under Chapter 11 embody certain potential benefits de-
pending upon which provision is favored. On the one hand, allowing the
courts to use their broad equitable powers to discharge non-debtors may
facilitate the reorganization of the debtor, ensure cooperation of third
parties whose assistance is essential for a successful reorganization,
possibly generate non-debtor contributions to the reorganization that the
non-debtor otherwise would not have made, and cut off any claim for
indemnification or contribution that the non-debtor may have against the
debtor. On the other hand, precluding third-party discharges will main-
tain the integrity of guaranties which in turn will have a beneficial impact
upon the costs of financing, increase the probability that victims of joint
tortfeasors will receive full compensation, and remove a sanctuary for
culpable officers and directors of corporations. Moreover, precluding
5. See Richard F. Broude, Recent Developments in the Chapter 11 Plan Process,
C638 ALI-ABA 251 (1991), available in Westlaw, TP-ALLREV database (citing Inforex
Inc. v. Burridge (In re Inforex), 26 B.R. 515 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); United States ex rel.
Small Business Admin. v. Kurtz, 525 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d
827 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982)). But see Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security
Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.) (the court, prior to
confirmation of the reorganization plan, issued a permanent injunction barring enforce-
ment of a state court judgment against a non-debtor), aff'd, 25 B.R. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
Section 524(e) is codified in Chapter 5 of the Code. Chapter 5 is applicable to Chapter 11
cases by way of § 103(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
6. See Broude, supra note 5.
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1) (1988).
8. Section 105(a) is codified in Chapter 1 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-109
(1988). Section 103(a) provides that Chapter 1 is applicable to cases under Chapter 11.
See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
9. See Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. Tex.
L. Rev. 487, 489-90 (1988).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
11. See Joel C. Shapiro, Non-Debtor Third Parties and the Bankruptcy Code: Is
Protection Available Without Actually Filing?, 95 Com. L.J. 345, 347 (1990). For pur-
poses of this Note, a "non-debtor discharge" is a permanent injunction issued pursuant to
the bankruptcy court's § 105(a) equitable powers.
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non-debtor discharges ensures that only parties that have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court will receive the benefits intended
under the Code.
This Note addresses the central question that arises as a result of in-
consistent interpretations of sections 524(e) and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code: Whether the bankruptcy court has the authority under section
105(a) to discharge a non-debtor via confirmation of a Chapter I I plan of
reorganization in spite of section 524(e)'s mandate that a discharge shall
not affect the obligations of non-debtors. Part I of this Note discusses
sections 524(e) and 105(a) in light of each respective provision's plain
meaning and statutory context, the Bankruptcy Act of 189812 (the "Act"
or "Bankruptcy Act"), and the Code's legislative history. Part II exam-
ines the manner in which courts have interpreted the Code with respect
to the discharge of third-party non-debtor liability. Part III argues that
the language, nature, and statutory context of the Code preclude a non-
debtor discharge. Further, this Part urges Congress to codify the bank-
ruptcy court's powers over insurance proceeds in order to restrict access
to liability insurance proceeds to aggrieved parties and ensure equitable
distribution of such funds in cases with multiple tort claimants. Finally,
this Note concludes that the broad equitable powers of the bankruptcy
court should not be extended to protect third party non-debtors who
have not subjected themselves to the bankruptcy court's authority.
I. BACKGROUND TO SECTIONS 524 AND 105 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE: ORDINARY MEANING AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Section 524(e)
1. Statutory Language
The language and purpose of the Code are the initial points of inquiry
in determining whether section 524(e) operates as a bar against a non-
debtor discharge under section 105(a). It is well settled that the plain
meaning of the Code controls unless the provision of the Code in ques-
tion produces a result that is contrary to established legislative intent.'3
Section 524(e) reads as follows: "Except as provided in subsection
(a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the
liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for,
such debt."14 Thus, in light of the fact that a discharge only affects the
personal liabilities of a debtor,"5 an ordinary reading of the section results
in a construction that would operate to preclude a section 105(a) dis-
charge of a non-debtor.
12. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act] (repealed
1978) (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103).
13. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (citing
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988) (emphasis added). Section 524(a)(3) deals with com-
munity claims-claims relating to a marital settlement. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3) (1988).
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(l)-(2) (1988).
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2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Section 524(e) is the successor statute to section 16 of the Bankruptcy
Act. 16 Section 16 provided: "The liability of a person who is co-debtor
with, or guarantor or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt shall not be
altered by the discharge of such bankrupt." 7 In addition, section 4(b) of
the Bankruptcy Act provided that a corporate debtor's discharge in
bankruptcy shall not vitiate the liability of the debtor's officers, directors,
stockholders, or other controlling entities.' 8 These provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act seemingly would have prevented the discharge of a
debtor from affecting the liability of specific third parties. Section 524(e),
on the other hand, is applicable to "any entity" other than the debtor.' 9
Section 524(e) is broader than its predecessor and should, therefore, be
applied broadly to restrict discharges of third parties.20
3. Legislative History
Section 524(e)'s legislative history is sparse and offers little interpreta-
tive insight. The only reference to this section in the House or Senate
Reports on the then-pending bankruptcy reform legislation is found in
the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, which simply states that
"[s]ubsection (d) [sic] provides the discharge of the debtor does not affect
co-debtors or guarantors."'" This sole mention of the section by
Congress, albeit incorrectly referenced, was simply a paraphrase of the
section itself. Therefore, one may presume that Congress believed either
that the subsection was so straightforward that it needed no extended
discussion, or that Congress consciously ignored the subsection.
B. Section 105(a)
1. Statutory Language
In contrast to section 524(e), section 105(a) contains a blanket provi-
sion to effectuate the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 105(a)
provides, in pertinent part, that "[tihe court may issue any order, pro-
cess, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi-
16. See Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985).
17. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 16, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1978).
18. See Underhill, 769 F.2d at 1432 (quoting Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 4(b), 52
Stat. 840, 845 (repealed 1978) (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1976))).
19. Compare Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 16, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1978)
(providing that a discharge of debtor does not affect the liability of co-debtors, guarantors
and sureties) with 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988) (maintaining that a debtor's discharge does
not affect the liability of any entity other than the debtor).
20. Indeed, as one court noted, "[i]t is hard to view this change as anything but a
legislative mandate further to constrict the effect of a discharge." Kathy B. Enters., Inc.
v. United States, 779 F.2d 1413, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986).
21. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5867. See also Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Bankruptcy Code 446 (1990-
1991 ed.) [hereinafter Norton] (an editor's comment indicates that the Senate Report
should actually be read as subsection (e), not (d)).
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sions of this title."'  This subsection is generally regarded as the
provision of the Code embodying the bankruptcy court's equitable pow-
ers.23 Although Congress granted the bankruptcy court broad equitable
powers in section 105(a),24 those powers are restricted by the bounds of
the language and purpose of the Code.2"
The court's powers are admittedly broad. Indeed, courts have invoked
section 105 to control the rehabilitation of a debtor in mass-tort litigation
situations,26 stay state court proceedings to prevent obstruction of the
reorganization," and suspend or sanction inappropriate behavior by at-
torneys.28 Nevertheless, as one commentator emphasizes, "[i]njunctive
remedies under section 105 were not designed to create rights not other-
wise available under applicable law. As noted by several circuit courts of
appeals, bankruptcy courts are not to function as 'roving commission[s]
to do equity.' ",29 Thus, although the bankruptcy court's equitable pow-
ers are indeed expansive, they are not boundless.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). The effect of § 105(a) is similar to the All Writs Act.
See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 316-17 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273-74. The All Writs Act was codified in 1948 at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 and authorized the Supreme Court and all courts created by Congress to issue all
writs necessary to assist in the court's jurisdiction, provided the writ was agreeable with
the principles of law. See Leal, supra note 9, at 492-93 n.l .
"Section 105 was made part of the Code for the sake of continuity from prior law and
ease of reference." Id. at 494 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 317 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6274).
23. See Timothy B. DeSieno & Khuong T. Ho, Section 105--Power of Court, in 1991
Ann. Surv. Bankr. L. 437, 437 (William L. Norton, Jr. ed.); Leal, supra note 9, at 489 ni.
24. See Leal, supra note 9, at 489-90.
25. See Leal, supra note 9, at 489 n.2, 490; Cecelia N. Anekwe, Comment, Responsi-
ble Officers Get Green Light at the Intersection of the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes; Bank-
ruptcy Code Section 105 Can Be Used to Order the IRS to Apply Debtor Tax Payments to
Trust Fund Taxes, 21 Seton Hall L. Rev. 868, 868-69 (1991).
26. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); cf. MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re
Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.) ("The Bankruptcy Court properly is-
sued the orders pursuant to its equitable and statutory powers... ."), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 868 (1988).
27. See Leal, supra note 9, at 497-500.
28. See Desieno & Ho, supra note 23, at 443.
29. Leal, supra note 9, at 502 (citing Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey,
832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988); United States v.
Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co. (In
re Johnson Bronze Co.), 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985)). The equitable powers of the
courts under § 105(a) are not a license to disregard the language and meaning of the
Bankruptcy Code. See id at 490 n.6. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit stated, "' IT]he fact
that a proceedings [sic] is equitable does not give the judge a free-floating discretion to
redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of justice and fairness, however
enlightened those views may be.'" Id at 490-91 n.6 (quoting In re Chicago, M., St. P. &
Pac. IR1R, 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Guerin v. Well, Gotshal &
Manges, 205 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1953) (equitable powers do not confer unfettered
discretion upon a court to redistribute rights in any manner it sees fit).
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2. The Bankruptcy Act
Section 105(a) is the successor statute to section 2(a)(15) of the
Bankruptcy Act.3" Section 2(a)(15) provided that bankruptcy courts
may "[m]ake such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments,
in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the
enforcement of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, [t]hat an
injunction to restrain a court may be issued by the judge only."31 Thus,
section 105(a) contemplates greater equitable powers than those embod-
ied in its predecessor, section 2(a)(15).
3. Legislative History
Both the Senate and the House Reports on the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 noted that section 105(a) contained two changes from sec-
tion 2(a)(15) of the Act. The most pertinent of these alterations, with
respect to a bankruptcy court's authority to discharge non-debtors, re-
moved the previous limitations on the power of bankruptcy judges to
enjoin a court.32 In 1986, Congress amended section 105(a) to add a
second sentence authorizing sua sponte powers which were designed to
selectively broaden the scope of the court's powers.33
II. THE TUG-OF-WAR BETWEEN SECTIONS 524 AND 105:
RESTRICTIVE VERSUS EXPANSIVE VIEWS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY COURT'S EQUITABLE POWERS
A. Section 524: A Restriction on the Bankruptcy Court's
Equitable Powers
Courts that favor restricting equitable powers and, thus, precluding
non-debtor discharges, cite factors such as a court's lack of power to
30. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(15) (repealed 1978), in The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 As
Amended with Annotations 11 (John Hanna & James Angell MacLachlan eds., 4th ed.
1951) [hereinafter Hanna & Angell].
31. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(15) (repealed 1978), in Hanna & Angell, supra note 30, at
11.
32. See Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Bankruptcy Code and Related Legis-
lation, Legislative History and Editorial Commentary 75-76 (1990-1991 ed.) [hereinafter
Norton Bankruptcy]. Congress originally granted the courts equitable powers by enact-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1481 in 1978. See John E. Swallow, Note, The Power of the Shield-
Permanently Enjoining Litigation Against Entities other than the Debtor-a Look at In re
A.H. Robins Co., 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 707, 709. Section 1481 read as follows: A bank-
ruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty, but may not
enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the
judge of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment. Leal, supra note 9, at
494 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (repealed 1984)). Section 1481 of title 28 was re-
pealed as part of the 1984 amendments to the Code. See id. at 495. As a result, the
bankruptcy court's powers were defined in the Code solely by § 105 without any refer-
ence to title 28. See id. The House Report points out that § 105(a) authorizes a stay of
state court proceedings. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 316 (1977), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273-74.
33. See Leal, supra note 9, at 495.
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affect a relationship other than that of the debtor and creditor, 4 and its
inability to bypass section 524(e) by labelling a discharge as a permanent
injunction." In addition, courts, under both the Bankruptcy Code and
the Bankruptcy Act, have pointed to the fact that private parties cannot
waive a provision of the bankruptcy laws via consent to a plan of
reorganization.36
1. Section 524(e): A Bar to Non-Debtor Discharge
Section 16 of the Bankruptcy Act has been consistently interpreted as
blocking bankruptcy courts from discharging non-debtor liabilities.3 7 In-
deed, one circuit court noted that "[t]he bankruptcy court can affect only
the relationship of debtors and creditor.' ' 3s Section 16 was significant be-
cause, pursuant to its terms, operations of the federal bankruptcy laws
could not effect the discharge of a co-obligor.39
A substantial number of courts continue to follow this line of reason-
ing developed under section 16 of the Act.4" Section 524(e), similar but
not identical to its predecessor, places restrictions on a discharge that
prevent the discharge from affecting the obligations of any party other
than the debtor.4 Indeed, "[t]he confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization should not release the obligations of non-party entities to
34. See Mellon Bank v. Siegel, 96 B.R. 505, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Elsinore Shore
Assocs., 91 B.R. 238, 254 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988); Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. (In re A.J.
Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 761 (D. Utah 1985).
35. See American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hard-
woods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989).
36. See Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985); Union Carbide
Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982) (decided under the Bankruptcy
Act).
37. See Union Carbide Corp., 686 F.2d at 595; Weber v. Diversey Bldg. Corp. (In re
Diversey Bldg. Corp.), 86 F.2d 456, 458 (7th Cir. 1936); see also R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev.
Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 490 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976) (bankruptcy court "has no power
to affect the obligation of guarantors"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977). The non-
debtors in all of these cases were guarantors on various obligations of the debtors. See
Union Carbide, 686 F.2d at 594-95; R.I.D.C., 539 F.2d at 490-91; Diversey Bldg., 86 F.2d
at 456.
38. R.I.D.C., 539 F.2d at 490 n.3 (emphasis added).
39. See Union Carbide, 686 F.2d at 595 (citing R.I.D.C., 539 at 490 n.3).
40. See, e.g., Landsing Diversified Properties-II v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In
re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600-01 (10th Cir. 1990) (a discharge in
bankruptcy is available only to a debtor, and therefore, § 524(e)'s mandate prohibiting a
discharge from affecting the liability of "any other entity" precludes discharge of non-
debtor), modified sub nom. Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (1991); Seaport Automotive
Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc.),
113 B.R. 610, 616-17 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (an injunction barring actions against co-
debtor for five years violated § 524(e) because it affected the liability of an entity other
than the debtor); American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American
Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989) (specific provisions of § 524 prohibit
the court from granting a permanent injunction to guarantors); Underhill v. Royal, 769
F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (bankruptcy court has no power to discharge the liability
of non-debtor in plan of reorganization).
41. See Underhill, 769 F.2d at 1432; see also Western Real Estate, 922 F.2d at 600
(section 524(e) operates to restrict discharges to the debtor who has "invoked and submit-
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creditors of a debtor."42 Accordingly, courts holding a restrictive view
toward discharges reason that a plan of reorganization purporting to dis-
charge a non-debtor violates section 524(e)43 and is invalid under section
1129(a).4 Moreover, these courts argue, the equitable powers of the
bankruptcy court under section 105(a) must yield to the more specific
mandate of section 524(e).4
2. Section 524(a): Closing the Door on Permanent Injunctions
Barring Claims Against Non-Debtors
A discharge in bankruptcy is available only to parties that submit to
the burdens of the bankruptcy laws.46 The effect of a discharge, as out-
ted to the bankruptcy process"); Rohnert Park Auto Parts, 113 B.R. at 617 (section 524(e)
is violated because plan purports to affect liabilities of entities other than the debtor).
42. In re Texaco Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
43. See, e.g., Mellon Bank v. M.K. Siegel, 96 B.R. 505, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (bank-
ruptcy court lacks power to discharge guarantor, who is not a party to the Chapter 11
proceeding, in the plan of reorganization); In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., 91 B.R. 238, 249-
50 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (a plan of reorganization that improperly releases a third-party
non-debtor cannot be confirmed); In re Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 486 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1988) (a provision of a plan of reorganization purporting to release non-debt-
ors in consideration for funding of the plan violated § 524(e)); In re L.B.G. Properties,
Inc., 72 B.R. 65, 66 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (section 524(e) precludes the release of non-
debtors in a plan of reorganization); In re Eller Bros., Inc., 53 B.R. 10, 11-12 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1985) (a provision of the plan "requiring the FDIC to release nonparty guar-
antors ... abrogated the standard under § 1 129(a)(1) by violating the provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 524(e)"); Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In re A.J. Mackay
Co.), 50 B.R. 756, 761 (D. Utah 1985) (bankruptcy court has no power to discharge a
non-bankrupt in a plan of reorganization; the only way a person can take advantage of
the protection available in bankruptcy is to file for bankruptcy himself or herself); Hat-
Hanseatische Anlage v. Sago Palms Joint Venture (In re Sago Palms Joint Venture), 39
B.R. 9, 9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (a provision in the plan purporting to release the princi-
pal of the debtor, who was accused of embezzlement, violated § 524(e) and was ineffec-
tual to the extent that it discharged the principal from personal liability); cf Inforex, Inc.
v. Burridge (In re Inforex, Inc.), 26 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (a plan of
reorganization purporting to extinguish all rights of shareholders did not bar sharehold-
ers from bringing an action under § 10(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
because officers and directors of corporations are individually liable for their own tortious
conduct).
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1988). A plan of reorganization that violates any provi-
sion of the Code may not be confirmed. See id.
45. See Seaport Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc. (In re
Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc.), 113 B.R. 610, 617 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990); cf In re
Golden Plan of California, Inc., 829 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir. 1986) (the equitable powers
of the bankruptcy court are strictly limited by the specific provisions of the bankruptcy
laws); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983)
(bankruptcy court may only exercise its equitable powers to the extent that it is consistent
with the provisions of the Code), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
46. See Landsing Diversified Properties-I v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1990), modified sub nom.
Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (1991); Lussier v. Barrup (In re Barrup), 51 B.R. 321, 323
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1985); SEC Brief, supra note 12, at 4. The Tenth Circuit noted "Congress
did not intend to extend such benefits to third-party bystanders." Western Real Estate,
922 F.2d at 600 (citing 3 Collier on Bankruptcy T 524.01[3], at 524-16 (Lawrence P. King
et al. eds., 15th ed. 1990)).
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lined in section 524(a), is limited to obligations that are personal liabili-
ties of the debtor.47 Under the restrictive view towards non-debtor
discharges, a court cannot circumvent this restriction by labelling the
discharge of a non-debtor as a permanent injunction.48 In effect, a dis-
charge is an injunction, and any attempt to distinguish the two is an
unpersuasive semantic exercise." Indeed, a permanent injunction "falls
squarely within the definition of a discharge under section 524(a)(2), ' ' I
and is, therefore, restricted by the provisions of section 524(e).11
3. Discharges in Bankruptcy Effective Under Operation of Law
Creditor consent to a reorganization plan that purports to discharge a
non-debtor does not serve as a waiver of the restrictions imposed by sec-
tion 524(e). Where a bankruptcy court discharges a party's liability, "it
does so by operation of the bankruptcy laws, not by consent of the credi-
tors."15 2 Consent to a Chapter l1 plan does not operate as a "private
contract" to release a non-debtor from liability. 3 Any contribution that
a non-debtor makes to a reorganization cannot serve as consideration for
a discharge.'
47. See Barrup, 51 B.R. at 323. Section 524(a) provides as follows:
A discharge... under this title-
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judg-
ment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any
debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title,
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any
such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such
debt is waived...
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1)-(2) (1988)(emphasis added).
48. See American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American
Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989).
49. See id. In support of its position, the Ninth Circuit points out that § 524(a)(2)
describes a discharge as an injunction, and the court concludes that a discharge is a spe-
cial kind of permnent injunction. See id
50. Id
51. See id.
52. Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Union Carbide
Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982) ("A bankruptcy discharge arises by
operation of federal bankruptcy law, not by contractual consent of the creditors."); In re
Kornbluth, 65 F.2d 400, 401 (2d Cir. 1933) (discharge in bankruptcy is effectuated by
operation of law, not by contract).
53. See Underhill, 769 F.2d at 1432 (citations omitted); Union Carbide, 686 F.2d at
595.
54. See Underhill, 769 F.2d at 1432 (quoting Union Carbide, 686 F.2d at 595). But
see In re AOV Indus., Inc., 792 F.2d 1140, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (in order to draw from
a fund contributed to the reorganization by a non-debtor, creditors were obligated to
tender releases of the non-debtor's liability); In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 80 B.R. 324,
334-35 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (concurring with the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in AOVIndus that a voluntary release of a non-debtor in exchange for access to
a fund contributed to the reorganization by the non-debtor may be valid).
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B. Section 1OS(a): A Powerful Tool of Equity
With respect to non-debtor discharges, courts that have adopted an
expansive view of section 105(a)'s equitable powers typically begin by
noting that specific language of section 524(e) does not foreclose the dis-
charge of third parties under an accepted plan of reorganization.55 While
overcoming the section 524 hurdle seems important, the courts invoking
section 105(a) generally focus on the policies and rationales underlying
non-debtor discharges.
1. Rationales Underlying Non-Debtor Discharges
Courts that invoke section 105(a) to release the liability of a non-
debtor consistently espouse overriding policy concerns. Many of these
policies are classic bankruptcy themes that recur throughout cases in
which the plan of reorganization provides for the discharge of a non-
debtor.56 The policies most often cited include the concerns that: (1) a
claim against a non-debtor is tantamount to a claim against the debtor
where the non-debtor will have a claim of indemnification or contribu-
tion against the debtor either through the operation of surety law, the
debtor-company's charter, state corporation laws, or by way of agree-
ment between the debtor and the non-debtor;57 (2) a non-debtor contrib-
uting to the reorganization will not contribute funds if claims against the
non-debtor are not enjoined, thereby adversely affecting the reorganiza-
tion;5" and (3) suits against a third party who has a role in restructuring
55. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v.
UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (quoting Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d
at 702); see also Republic Supply Co. v. Shoa, 815 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1987) (sec-
tion 524(e) "does not by its specific words preclude the discharge of a guarant[or] when
[the discharge] has been accepted and confirmed as an integral part of a plan of reorgani-
zation"). The Fifth Circuit in Republic Supply did not decide the issue of whether
§ 524(e) prevents a bankruptcy court from discharging the liabilities of a non-debtor
under § 105(a) but rather found that the issue of liability of debtor's guarantor was res
judicata because a provision discharging the non-debtor guarantor was included in the
plan of reorganization, and the plan was confirmed without objection and was not ap-
pealed. See id. at 1049-50.
56. See generally Shapiro, supra note 11, at 347 (noting three situations where courts
have utilized § 105(a) powers to discharge guarantors: (1) where guarantor's assets will
be a source of funds for debtor's reorganization; (2) where non-debtors time and energy is
required for a successful reorganization; and (3) where a finding of liability against non-
debtor would, as a practical matter, be imputed to debtor).
57. See, eg., Menard-Sanford, 880 F.2d at 702 ("entire reorganization hinged on the
debtor being free from indirect claims such as suits against parties who would have in-
demnity or contribution claims against the debtor"); UNARCO, 124 B.R. at 278 (quoting
with emphasis the statement of the Menard-Sanford court that reorganization depended
upon cutting off claims for indemnification and contribution); cf. Otero Mills, Inc. v.
Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills), 25 B.R. 1018, 1022 (D.N.M. 1982) (indicating
the significance of enjoining claim against party who may assert pressure on debtor).
58. See, eg., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir.) (settlement with insurance companies, which provided for the
insurer's contribution of proceeds to a claimant's fund in exchange for discharge of liabil-
ities, was "cornerstone" of reorganization), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988); Myerson &
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the debtor, but who has incurred personal liability to a creditor, may
adversely affect the reorganization because the third party's attention
may be distracted from the reorganization efforts or the third party will
have no incentive to continue its efforts if claims against it or others are
not enjoined. 9 By releasing non-debtors in these type of cases, courts
aim to promote a primary goal of the Bankruptcy Code: provide the
debtor with a "fresh start."'
2. Mass Tort Claims Versus Non-Mass Tort Claims
a. Mass Tort Claims: Leading the Charge for Section 105(a)
Equitable Powers
Courts confronted with debtors that were forced into bankruptcy
under the pressures of mass-tort claims have significantly expanded the
powers of the bankruptcy court by invoking section 105(a) as support for
non-debtor discharges under complex circumstances.6 Some courts be-
lieve that, in the face of mass-tort litigation, equity supersedes the strict
requirements of the Code.62 The two most prominent mass tort bank-
ruptcies are those of the A.H. Robins Company, the manufacturer of the
Kuhn v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 156-
57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (determining that a permanent injunction discharging non-
debtor is appropriate where non-debtor is contributing to the reorganization); UNARCO,
124 B.R. at 278 (discharge was appropriate for insurance companies contributing monies
to the reorganization but would not be appropriate for insurers that did not settle and
contribute proceeds); Otero Mills, 25 B.R. at 1020-22 (permanent injunction preventing
creditor from recovering on a state court judgment against guarantor/president of debtor
was appropriate where president intended to contribute the proceeds of the assets that
were subject to foreclosure).
59. See, eg., In re Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45 B.R. 202, 205 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1984) (enjoining the IRS from collecting debtor's trust fund taxes from non-debtor,
a "responsible" officer of the debtor, upon officer's threat to "throw in the towel" on
debtor's reorganization if the court allowed the IRS to proceed); see also In re A.H.
Robins Co. Inc., 88 B.R 742, 747-48 (E.D. Va. 1988) (testimony had been presented at
hearing to confirm plan that acquiror/non-debtor deemed it vital that it be protected
from all litigation relating to the Dalkon Shield); Swallow, supra note 32, at 713
(American Home Products' proposed acquisition of A.H. Robins was contingent upon
discharges of American Home Products, A.H. Robins, and A.H. Robins' affiliates and
employees).
60. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
61. See eg., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701-
02 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989) (section 105(a) confers power on the
bankruptcy court to enjoin suits against third parties); Johns-Manville, 837 F.2d at 93-94
(section 105(a) is to be interpreted liberally to enjoin claims that may hinder the reorgani-
zation, particularly suits against settling insurers); see also UNARCO Bloomington
Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 279 (N.D. I11. 1990) (noting that
§ 105(a) confers power upon the bankruptcy court to issue an injunction barring suits
against insurer in order to preserve a settlement between debtor and an insurer).
62. See Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort
Law, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 269, 319 (citing Menard-Sanford; Kane v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 641-47 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 488 U.S.
868 (1988)); see also Leal, supra note 9, at 497 (an expansive view toward a bankruptcy
court's equitable powers may be appropriate in the case of mass tort litigation).
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Dalkon Shield contraceptive device, and the Johns-Manville Corpora-
tion, a producer of asbestos.
In both instances, the question of the liability of the debtors' insurance
companies was a significant issue.63 The Fourth Circuit in Menard-
Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.)" and the Second Circuit in
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.)65
both upheld discharges of the debtors' liability insurers. Relying primar-
ily upon the bankruptcy court's section 105(a) equitable powers, the
Fourth Circuit affirned discharges of not only the insurance-policy lia-
bility of the debtor's insurer, but also the joint tortfeasor liability of the
debtor's insurer, officers, directors, and attorneys.6 The Second Circuit,
63. The issue of whether claimants can proceed directly against a debtor's liability
insurer is one that has been arising with increasing frequency in bankruptcy proceedings.
See Barry L. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 373, 373
(1989) [hereinafter Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds]. An insurance company's liability for
the tortious conduct of the debtor is limited by the terms of the policy. Therefore, where
the insurance proceeds payments exceed the policy limits, the insurer will no longer re-
main liable on the policy.
64. 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989). A.H. Robins filed for
protection under Chapter 11 in response to an avalanche of suits brought by women who
sustained injury from use of the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device. The Fourth Circuit
upheld a plan of reorganization that discharged the liabilities of entities other than Rob-
ins. See id. at 700. The entities and individuals which may have been liable, jointly with
A.H. Robins, for injuries suffered from use of the Dalkon Shield included: Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company, A.H. Robins' product liability insurer; E. Claiborne
Robins, Sr., Chairman of the Board and former CEO; E. Claiborne Robins, Jr., President
and CEO; other officers and directors responsible for alleged misconduct; and A.H. Rob-
ins' law firm, which allegedly conspired with the company to destroy and/or withhold
evidence pertaining to the Dalkon Shield. See Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law: The
Story of the Dalkon Shield Bankruptcy 63 (1991).
65. 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988). Manville filed for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11 in response to a flood of suits arising out of its asbestos manu-
facturing business. The court discharged the obligation of the insurer as part of a
settlement whereby the insurer would pay approximately $770 million into a settlement
fund in exchange for discharge of obligations under disputed policies. As part of the
settlement, the bankruptcy court was to issue injunctions to protect the insurer against
claims stemming from the disputed policies. The insurer could terminate the settlement
if the injunctive orders were not issued or if they were overturned on appeal. See id. at
90.
66. See id. at 700, 701-02. The court invoked § 105(a) to justify enjoining suits
against the non-debtor entities, noting that the court has the power to implement the
equitable doctrine of marshalling of assets. Marshalling of assets, according to the court,
occurs when two distinct funds are available from which a creditor can satisfy its claim;
the court may order the creditor to recover from one source so as not to impair the claims
of other creditors. See id. at 701. The rationale of the court was that the only parties
who would be adversely affected were the Dalkon Shield claimants who chose to opt out
of Class B in the Breland settlement. See id. The Breland settlement was a settlement
resulting from a class action suit brought by Dalkon Shield claimants against Aetna on
the insurer's independent tort liability. Class B claimants were defined as "those Dalkon
Shield claimants who did not meet the filing deadline or like procedural requirements and
are therefore not eligible for a non-subordinated recovery from the trust fund for reasons
not related to the abstract merits of the claims." Swallow, supra note 32, at 715-16 n.40.
The Breland settlement was upheld by the Fourth Circuit. See In re A.H. Robins Co.,
880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989). Allowing Class B claimants to
bring a suit in violation of the plan would serve to defeat the plan. See Menard-Sanford,
[Vol. 61
CHAPTER 11: NON-DEBTOR DISCHARGES
unlike the Fourth Circuit, did not invoke section 105(a) as the primary
authority empowering the court to discharge non-debtors. Rather, the
court used section 105(a) as additional support to release various liability
insurers from obligation on Johns-Manville's insurance policies in ex-
change for contributions to a claimants' trust fund.'7 The primary ra-
tionale was that the insurance proceeds were property of the debtor's
estate and the bankruptcy court, authorized by the Code, could properly
exert jurisdiction over all such property.68
880 F.2d at 702. Alternatively, they would receive full payment if foregoing their right to
opt out. See id. In addition, American Home Products had offiered to acquire A.H.
Robins and contribute $2.3 billion to a claimants' trust fund. The offer to acquire, and
hence the $2.3 billion contribution, was contingent upon the release of American Home
Products, A.H. Robins, and their affiliates and personnel from liability from litigation
connected with the Dalkon Shield. See Swallow, supra note 32, at 713.
The court's application of the marshalling doctrine was misplaced. A "necessary ele-
ment" for applying the doctrine of marshalling is that one debtor has two funds from
which a particular creditor may draw. See Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick,
From the Bankruptcy Courts, 18 UCC LJ. 178, 180 (1985). This "common debtor" ele-
ment is absent where the creditor has a claim against the assets of the debtor as well as
against assets of a non-debtor. See id, at 180-81.
67. See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837
F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988). Noting that the insurance settle-
ment was critical to the reorganization, the Second Circuit held that the bankruptcy
court had power to issue the injunctions because the insurance policies were property of
the estate as defined in § 541(a)(1) and therefore within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court. See id at 91-92. As further support for the bankruptcy court's authority to dis-
charge the insurer, the Second Circuit relied on § 105(a). The equities weighed in favor
of granting the injunction because permitting suits against the insurer would adversely
affect the property of the estate and would undermine the reorganization. See id at 93.
Furthermore, the party seeking relief from the injunction was adequately protected be-
cause its claim was not extinguished but merely channeled to the settlement fund. See id.
A trust was established funded by the insurance companies' contributions, contribu-
tions from the corporation, and 50% of the equity in the reorganized corporation, along
with the right to increase the equity stake to 80% if necessary. See Sobol, supra note 64,
at 57.
68. See Johns-Manville, 837 F.2d at 91-92; see also Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds,
supra note 63, at 386 (noting that "weight of authority holds that insurance proceeds are
property of the estate") (citations omitted). The Second Circuit held that the insurance
proceeds were part of the debtor's estate under § 541(a). See Johns-Manville, 837 F.2d at
91-92. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court had the authority to enjoin suits
against the insurers because the insurance proceeds, as property of the estate, fell within
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See id; see also A.H. Robins v. Piccinin (In re
A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994, 1001-02 (4th Cir.) (insurance proceeds deemed property
of estate), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986).
The issue of whether insurance proceeds are in fact property of the debtor's estate is
beyond the scope of this Note. However, courts that have found insurance proceeds to be
property of the estate, "have enjoined any action to recover against the insurance com-
pany despite section 524(e)." Charles A. Beckham, Jr., It's All an Unsecured Claim to
Me: The Tortious Interference of Bankruptcy Law with Liability Insurance Proceeds, 22
Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 779, 797 n.137 (1991) (citing Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H.
Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989)); see also
UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 278-79
(N.D. Ii. 1990) (bankruptcy court had authority to enjoin actions against insurers that
had settled with the debtor because the insurance policies were property of the debtor's
estate). Other courts have held that § 524(e) prevents the discharge of the debtor from
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In its discussion of section 105(a), the Second Circuit did not mention
the conflict between sections 105(a) and 524(e).69 The Fourth Circuit, on
the other hand, confronted the issue and concluded that section 524(e)
should not be literally construed in every case to restrict the equitable
powers of the bankruptcy court. The court deemed this conclusion ap-
propriate, particularly in light of the facts in A.H. Robins: the plan was
overwhelmingly approved; the plan, together with other safeguards, gave
late claimants a second chance to recover; certain parties were able to opt
out of the settlement to retain rights against certain non-debtors; and the
reorganization hinged upon the non-debtor discharges.70
b. Non-Mass Tort Claims: Equity in Action
Some courts, confronted with issues less complex than those of mass
tort bankruptcy, have nonetheless flexed their equitable muscles to dis-
charge non-debtors.7 Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re
altering the liability of the insurance company. See Owaski v. Jet Florida Sys., Inc. (In re
Jet Florida Sys., Inc.), 883 F.2d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Beckham, supra, at
797 n. 137 (noting that most courts reviewing this issue have found that a discharge of the
debtor does not relieve the insurer from liability). The courts, holding that the insurance
company's liability is not discharged, did not consider whether insurance proceeds are
property of the debtor's estate. See id.
Where insurance proceeds are deemed property of the estate, a problem of distributing
these proceeds to tort victims exists. The property of the estate is distributed according
to the priority rules set forth in the Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726, 1129 (1988) (outlin-
ing the priorities for distribution under the Code). Several groups of creditors will have
priority to these proceeds ahead of the tort claimants. See Beckham, supra, at 793.
Courts exerting jurisdiction over insurance proceeds have not always followed this pri-
ority scheme. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93 (proceeds of insurance settle-
ments were channeled to settlement fund); Sobol, supra note 64, at 233-34 (in A.H.
Robins' reorganization, insurer was to pay $75 million into a claimants' trust for victims
of the Dalkon Shield). But see UNARCO, 124 B.R. at 279 (insurance proceeds not chan-
neled to a claimants' trust, but rather to the reorganization in general to capitalize
debtor's new business operations). For a general discussion of insurance proceeds in
bankruptcy reorganizations see Beckham, supra (discussing the treatment of insurance
proceeds in bankruptcy, problems with such treatment, and a call for reform), and
Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 63, at 373 (discussing the treatment of insurance
proceeds in bankruptcy, problems, and solutions).
69. See Johns-Manville, 837 F.2d at 93-94 (the court noted the equitable powers of
the bankruptcy court as additional support for its position but did not discuss the poten-
tial of § 524(e) to limit such powers). Perhaps the court did not discuss § 524(e) with
respect to discharge of insurance companies because the court found that the insurance
proceeds were part of the debtor's estate. See id. at 91-92.
70. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robbins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989). The court in conclusion stated, "We leave ques-
tions concerning cases in which § 524(e) does apply for another day." Id.
71. See, e.g., In re The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d
Cir. 1992) (although the court did not discuss section 105(a), the court cited Menard-
Sanford in support of discharges of non-debtors in bankruptcy proceedings); Myerson &
Kuhn v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 157
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (section 524(e) will not operate to defeat a court's § 105(a)
equitable powers to issue permanent injunctive relief to non-debtor where the non-debtor
is contributing to the debtor's reorganization); In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B.R.
746, 751 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (section 105(a) injunction may be appropriate where
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Otero Mills, Inc.)' is the leading case in support of non-debtor dis-
charges73 in the absence of mass-tort considerations. There, the bank-
ruptcy court set forth a balancing test weighing, "1. [i]rreparable harm to
the bankruptcy estate if the injunction does not issue; 2. [s]trong likeli-
hood of [a] success[ful plan of reorganization]; and 3. [n]o harm or mini-
mal harm to the other party or parties."'74 Applying such a test to the
facts of the case, the court issued a permanent injunction barring the
enforcement of a state court judgment against the president of the
debtor.75
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, in
affirming the bankruptcy court's decision in Otero Mills, found that,
prior to considering the issuance of an injunction barring suits against
third parties, the conditions of the case must meet certain threshold juris-
dictional requirements. 7' The claim sought to be enjoined must (1) affect
the debtor's estate, and (2) adversely influence the debtor."7 Once these
threshold requirements are met, the district court held, it is proper for
the bankruptcy court to determine whether enjoining claims against non-
debtors is necessary and appropriate.7" An important element in the
non-debtor's assets are to be used as a source of funds for the debtor's reorganization),
modified, 69 B.R. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Old Orchard Inv. Co., 31 B.RL 599, 602-03
(W.D. Mich. 1983) (bankruptcy court had power under § 105(a) to enjoin suits against
non-debtor partners of the debtor partnership that could have been brought against
debtor); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 25 B.RL
1018, 1021 (D.N.M. 1982) (an injunction barring suits against a non-debtor may be
proper if the claims against non-debtor will affect the debtor's estate and adversely influ-
ence debtor); see also Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.),
21 B.1L 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.) (court applied a balancing test to issue injunction barring
enforcement of judgment against non-debtor), aff'd, 25 B.RL 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
72. 21 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M.), aff'd, 25 B.RL 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
73. See Monroe Well, 67 B.L at 751; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 346 (referring to
Otero Mills as a landmark decision).
74. Otero Mills, 21 B.L at 779. Although, the court issued a permanent injunction,
the balancing test promulgated by the court weighs three of the four prongs of the tradi-
tional preliminary injunction test. See Otero Mills, 25 B.R. at 1021.
75. See id The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, on
appeal, noted that the injunction issued by the bankruptcy court was in the nature of a
temporary stay. See Otero Mills, 25 B.R at 1021. The district court, however, earlier in
its decision, clearly stated that the injunction issued by the bankruptcy court "perma-
nently enjoined the [creditor] from executing... upon its state court judgment against"
the debtor's president, id at 1019, and noted that the bankruptcy court's decision con-
verted a preliminary injunction into a permanent order. See id Also, the bankruptcy
courts opinion explicitly acknowledged that it was analyzing the propriety of issuing a
permanent injunction. See Otero Mills, 21 B.RL at 778-79. Perhaps the district court
believed the injunction to be in the nature of a temporary stay because the order was
issued prior to the filing of the plan of reorganization and the bankruptcy court stated a
willingness to consider an application by the creditor to modify or lift the injunction if the
creditor believed that it was no longer adequately protected by additional sources of se-
curity available at that time. See Otero Mills, 25 B.L at 1021-22. Although, the creditor
could freely apply to have the injunction modified or lifted, this does not alter the fact
that the injunction issued was indeed permanent
76. See Otero Mills, 25 B.R. at 1021.
77. See id,
78. See id, The district court in Otero Mills determined that the conditions satisfied
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court's decision that the particular discharge was appropriate was that
the non-debtor intended to contribute the personal assets, upon which
the creditor was attempting to foreclose, to the debtor's reorganization.
Furthermore, as president and shareholder, the non-debtor could assert
adverse influence upon the debtor to satisfy its debt to the creditor if
claims against the non-debtor were not enjoined.7 9 Although the deci-
sion to discharge a non-debtor under such circumstances involves enor-
mous discretion, the courts following such an approach, apparently have
concluded that the policies warrant such discretion.
III. ANALYSIS: THE DOMINANT PULL OF SECTION 524
Although, valid arguments exist to support both sides in the debate
over the validity of non-debtor discharges under Chapter 11, proponents
of section 524(e), that advocate restricting third-party releases, put forth
the more compelling view. Bankruptcy proceedings that are factually or
emotionally complex may strengthen the claim for a section 105(a) re-
lease due to equitable considerations, but such circumstances can not
overcome the dominant pull of section 524. One certainty is that a court
cannot exert jurisdiction beyond the Code's limits simply in the name of
equity. 0 In short, the language, purpose, and statutory construction of
the Code preclude the discharge of a non-debtor. Moreover, analysis of
cases discharging non-debtors suggests that the policies underlying such
discharges are unsound and that bankruptcy courts should not overreach
their authority under the guise of such policies. Finally, with respect to
insurance proceeds in bankruptcy cases,81 Congress should enact legisla-
tion to ensure equitable distribution of proceeds to victims injured by the
debtor.
A. The Language, Nature, and Context of the Bankruptcy Code
Preclude Non-Debtor Discharges
1. Plain Meaning: The Code When Read as a "Holistic Endeavor"
Prohibits Discharges of Third Parties
As stated earlier, to resolve discrepancies between sections of the
Bankruptcy Code, the starting point must be the language of Code. 2
Some courts and commentators have espoused a view that section 524(e)
the threshold requirements and affirmed the non-debtor discharge. See id. In determining
whether to grant the discharge, the court utilized the three part balancing test developed
by the bankruptcy court below. The district court noted that the bankruptcy court did
not analyze the fourth factor of the usual preliminary injunction test-public interest, but
that the factor played a role in the bankruptcy court's decision. See id.
79. See id. at 1022.
80. See Leal, supra note 9, at 490-91 n.6.
81. See infra notes 157-61, 163-69 and accompanying text (discussing whether insur-
ance proceeds are property of a debtor's estate and problems arising from excluding and
including such proceeds from the estate).
82. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
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does not by its specific wording preclude the discharge of a non-debtor. 3
When read in a vacuum, section 524(e) would appear to leave the door
open for discharges of non-debtors because it only purports to restrict the
effect of a debtor's discharge and does not provide any insight into the
discharge of other entities. This subsection, however, should not be read
in a vacuum. Instead, it should be read in conjunction with the entire
Code, particularly with subsection (a) of the same section. 4  Section
524(a) restricts a discharge to debts that are "personal liabilities of the
debtor.""5
Proponents of expansive equitable powers may counter that, while a
discharge may be personal to a debtor, an order in the form of a perma-
nent injunction is not. 6 This argument, however, must fail because a
discharge and a permanent injunction are the same exact instrument-if
not in name, then in operation."7
If section 524(e) should be read as not specifically precluding a third-
party discharge," the language of section 105(a) becomes essential in de-
termining if that provision indeed grants the bankruptcy court the power
83. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702 (4th
Cir.) (citing Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1987)), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus.,
Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 278 (N.D. IM. 1990); Swallow, supra note 32, at 710-11.
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988); supra note 47 and accompanying text. Indeed, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont explicitly referred to
§ 524(a) in finding that a "discharge is intended for the benefit of the debtor and does not
effect the rights of any other parties." Lussier v. Barrup (In re Barrup), 51 B.R. 321, 323
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1985); see also Owaski v. Jet Florida Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Florida Sys.,
Inc.), 883 F.2d 970, 973 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that section 524(a) only permits dis-
charges of the personal liabilities of the debtor and "'[s]ection 524(e) was intended for
the benefit of the debtor but was not meant to affect the liability of third parties'" (quot-
ing 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 524.01, at 524-16 (R. Babbitt et al. eds., 15th ed. 1987));
SEC Brief, supra note 2, at 4 ("The Bankruptcy Code... contemplates that a discharge
only affects the debts of those submitting to its burdens").
85. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1)-(2) (1988) (emphasis added); see also Landsing Diversified
Properties-U v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.),
922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1990) (discharge only available to parties filing for bank-
ruptcy), modified sub nom. Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (1991); Schultz v. Shapiro (In re
Shapiro), 59 B.R. 844, 847 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (discharge only inures to the benefit
of the honest debtor).
86. The court under § 105(a) may issue any order that is necessary or appropriate.
See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). An injunction is, after all, a court order.
87. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. A discharge does not extinguish
the discharged party's liability; it merely erects a barrier to recovery. See Western Real
Estate Fund, 922 F.2d at 601-02; American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp.
(In re American Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Lembke, 93
B.R. 701, 702-03 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988); Shade v. Fasse (In re Fasse), 40 B.R. 198, 200
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1984); Green v. Yang (In re Green), 29 B.R. 682, 685 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1983).
88. See e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins, Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 702
(4th Cir.) (court found that § 524(e) does not specifically preclude a non-debtor dis-
charge), cert denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v.
UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (same); Swallow, supra note 32, at
723 (arguing that the language of § 524(e) does not explicitly preclude a third party
discharge).
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to discharge non-debtors. The equitable powers of the court under sec-
tion 105(a) are limited to actions necessary to carry out the provisions
and purpose of the Code.8 9 Therefore, in order for a particular applica-
tion of section 105(a) to carry out a provision of the Code, there must be
a section which implies that discharges of non-debtors are necessary or
appropriate. No provision, however, applicable to Chapter 11 provides
for the discharge of third parties.90
One commentator has pointed to section 1123(b)(5) as evidence that
the discharge of third parties is appropriate. 91 Section 1123(b)(5) pro-
vides that a plan of reorganization may "include any ... provision not
inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title."'92 Applying
these two sections in tandem would be the equivalent of granting the
court the authority to take any action it deems necessary to ensure the
success of a plan of reorganization, as long as such action does not vio-
late an express provision of the Code. Advocates of such a combination
are essentially proposing the use of one catch-all provision to implement
another catch-all provision. This approach results in bootstrapping to
exert jurisdiction over the rights a creditor has against a non-debtor.93
2. The Purpose of the Code Does Not Contemplate Applying the
Code to Relationships Other than Those Between Debtor
and Others
Legislative intent controls where the language of the Code is demon-
strably at odds with its purpose. 94 Even though the plain meaning of
section 524 is clear and thus should govern, it is imperative to examine
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). The specific language of § 105(a) actually limits
the section to actions necessary to carry out the provisions of this title. See Desieno & Ho,
supra note 23, at 437.
90. See, eg., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-560, 1101-74 (1988) (no provision included in or per-
taining to Chapter 11 specifically permits discharge of a third party); see also Cook &
Brenner, supra note 1, at *1 ("The Code does note extend the Chapter 11 discharge to
nondebtors.").
91. See Swallow, supra note 32, at 723; cf. Harvey R. Miller et a]., Formulation of a
Confirmable Chapter 11 Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, in Practising Law Institute,
Secured Creditors and Lessors Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act 1990, at 351 (Com-
mercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 544, 1990) (section 1123(b)(5) per-
mits a Chapter 11 plan to include any appropriate provision not inconsistent with other
provisions of the Code, and therefore a plan may release a third party in exchange for a
contribution to a reorganization fund).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1988).
93. It is worth noting that none of the courts discussed supra invoked § 105(a) to-
gether with § 1123(b)(5) in this manner. See, e.g., Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H.
Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.) (court did not purport to invoke § 1123(b)(5)), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re
Johns-Manville, Corp.), 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988);
Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121
B.R. 145 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v.
UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (same); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security
Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 25 B.R. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982) (same).
94. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); supra note
100 and accompanying text.
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the purpose and goals of the Code to ensure that the section's application
coincides with the intent of the Code's drafters.
A number of purposes underlie the Bankruptcy Code. Among the
goals to which the courts and commentators most often refer are the
goals of providing the debtor with a "fresh start,""5 maximizing the value
of the bankrupt's assets through either reorganization or liquidation,96
and providing fair and equitable treatment to all creditors.97 Indeed,
Congress has indicated in the Code's legislative history that the purpose
of a reorganization is to rehabilitate the debtor so that it may continue to
provide its employees with jobs, satisfy its debts to its creditors, and yield
a return to its shareholders.9" While these were lofty aims, the Code's
drafters failed to express or imply how these goals were to be weighed
against the rights a creditor may hold against a third party. Given this
void, this portion of the legislative history is not relevant to the present
analysis.
One part of the legislative history does shed some light on the types of
relationships upon which the Bankruptcy Code is intended to have an
impact. The House Report indicates that the nature of bankruptcy is "to
sort out all of the debtor's legal relationships with others, and to apply the
principles and rules of the bankruptcy laws to those relationships. ' 99
Although a debtor may have relationships with both a creditor and a
third-party non-debtor, a relationship between the creditor and the non-
debtor is not the equivalent of a relationship between the debtor and an-
other party. Congress, therefore, could not have contemplated that the
bankruptcy laws would have a significant impact upon the relationships
between creditors and non-debtors.
95. See Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915);
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6141; Beckham, supra note 68, at 780; Harvey J. Kessner, Future Asbestos Related
Litigants as Holders of Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and
Their Place in the Johns-Manville Reorganization, 62 Am. Bankr. LJ. 159, 159 (Second
Installment); Robert L. Miller, Note, Chapter 13's Liberal Discharge Proisions and
"Willful and Malicious" Tort Judgments. Creditor Classification as Means of Accounting
for the Debtor's Egregious Action, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1065, 1068 (1991).
96. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 24-25 (1986);
Beckham, supra note 68, at 780; Barry L. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays in Chapter 11 Bank-
ruptcy, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 213, 228 (1988) [hereinafter Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays].
97. See Beckham, supra note 68, at 780 (citing Mitchell R. Julis, Classifying Rights
and Interests, Under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 Am. Bankr. LJ. 223, 234 (1981)); Walter
A. Effross, Deprizio's Honor. Lenders, Insider Guarantors and the Prisoners' Dilemma, 21
Seton Hall L. Rev. 774, 774 (1991).
98. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
99. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5971 (emphasis added); see also Landsing Diversified Properties-II
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592,
600 (10th Cir. 1990) (Congress did not intend to extend bankruptcy protection to "third-
party bystanders"), modified sub nom. Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (1991).
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3. Additional Canons of Construction: The Statutory Context
Implies Congress Did Not Intend for Non-Debtor Discharge
In analyzing the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court has instructed
bankruptcy courts to "look at the entire statutory context for inter-
pretory guidance." 1" One section of the Code is particularly germane to
the debate over whether section 105(a) overrides section 524(e) with re-
spect to the release of third parties. Upon a filing under Chapter 11,
section 362101 operates to automatically stay all actions to collect the
debtor's pre-petition debts. Similar to the conflict between section 524(e)
and section 105(a), a debate has ensued as to whether the automatic stay
may be extended to non-debtors by way of section 105(a).
Consistent with the Supreme Court's mandate to read the Code as a
"holistic endeavor,"'10 2 "[o]ne bankruptcy judge noted that after a review
of legislative history, it appeared that Congress considered the issue of a
general stay of actions against guarantors but apparently rejected a blan-
ket stay and limited this protection to co-debtors in Chapter 13 cases." 10 3
The fact that Chapter 131°4 provides a stay for certain non-debtors 05
indicates that Congress was aware that relationships between creditors
and third parties may be implicated during bankruptcy proceedings. By
not including a similar provision in Chapter 11, either for a temporary
stay or permanent injunction, Congress most likely did not intend that
injunctive relief, either preliminary or permanent, be extended to non-
debtors. 106
B. Unsound Policies Underlying Non-Debtor Discharges
Some courts, in the name of equity, have looked past the specific com-
mands of the Code. These courts have promulgated unsound policies to
support non-debtor discharges. The policies are unpersuasive regardless
of whether the Code allows for non-debtor discharges.
1. Indemnification/Contribution Theory for Discharge
a. Guarantors
The "indemnification/contribution" theory of non-debtor discharges
100. Swallow, supra note 32, at 723 (citing United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 365 (1988)).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
102. See United Sav. Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 371.
103. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 346 (citations omitted); see also Zaretsky, Co-Debtor
Stays, supra note 96, at 223-24 (noting the need to reconcile the fact that Chapter 13
provides for a non-debtor stay while Chapter 11 does not); Kimberly Colby Harris, Note,
The Impact of Bankruptcy on Liability of Corporate Directors, 5 Bankr. Devs. J. 289, 291-
92 (1987) (same).
104. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (1988).
105. See id. § 1301.
106. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 224; cf. Harris, supra note 103, at
291-92 (arguing that if Congress had intended for the Chapter I 1 stay provision to en-
compass non-debtors, it would have used specific language as it did in Chapter 13).
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holds that a claim against a non-debtor is the equivalent of a claim
against the debtor where such non-debtor will have a claim of indemnifi-
cation or contribution against the debtor. A guarantor who pays a debt
on behalf of a debtor will, in fact, receive a right of indemnification from
the debtor under suretyship law."0 7 The guarantor also acquires a right
of subrogation to the creditor's rights against the debtor."0 8 Under such
a framework, the practical effect is that the guarantor assumes the posi-
tion of the original creditor."° Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Williams
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,110 ruled that a surety that pays
the debt of a bankrupt may be subrogated to the rights of the creditor."'I
Equity favors holding the guarantor liable on the guaranty and subro-
gating the guarantor to the rights of the creditor.112 The sole reason for
the creditor obtaining a guaranty is to ensure payment in the event the
debtor defaults.11 Holding the guarantor liable on the debt simply vali-
dates the prior agreement among the debtor, creditor and guarantor.
Courts should not release a guarantor from its obligation simply be-
cause the guarantor will have a claim against a creditor for indemnifica-
tion. As one court has explained, "Debtor relief under bankruptcy is
personal to the debtor. This is true even when the non-debtor is a surety
which will be given a claim for indemnification against the estate [of the
debtor]."' 1 4 The debtor will be unaffected by enforcement of the guar-
anty because property of the guarantor will be used to satisfy the credi-
tor's claim under the guaranty.'
Furthermore, the guarantor will be unable to proceed against the
debtor on the claim for indemnification during the pendency of the reor-
ganization due to the Code's automatic stay provision. The claim for
indemnification will be discharged upon confirmation of the plan of reor-
ganization under section 1141(d)(1)(A)." 6 Under this provision, the
confirmation of a reorganization plan discharges the debtor from all
debts arising prior to the confirmation of such plan. Section 524 prevents
all parties from attempting to recover from the debtor a debt that has
been discharged-including a non-debtor who may seek
indemnification.' 17
107. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 236.
108. See id
109. See iL
110. 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
111. See id at 556.
112. See Cambridge Machined Prods. Corp. v. United States, 58 B.1L 22, 25 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1985) (a non-debtor who is responsible for the debtor's obligations to creditors
may either recover as a subrogee or must, in the alternative, file its own bankruptcy
petition).
113. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 236.
114. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Huddleston (In re Mike Rose Oil Co.), No. 90-23604-B,
1991 WL 110209, at *5 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 17, 1991) (citing Northeast Glass, Inc.
v. Alpen, Inc. (In re Northeast Glass, Inc.), 112 B.R. 475, 477 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990)).
115. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 236.
116. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (1988).
117. See Landsing Diversified Properties-I v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re
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Some courts have discharged a guarantor's liability, noting that the
non-debtor can assert adverse pressure upon the debtor to pay the
debt. 11  Where the guarantor is not an officer or principal of the debtor,
no such power exists because, as discussed previously, the guarantor es-
sentially will be foreclosed from pursuing its claim against the debtor.
On the other hand, where the non-debtor is an officer, director, or princi-
pal, the non-bankrupt party may be able to exert substantial internal
pressure upon the debtor due to its relationship with the debtor." 9
Under Chapter 11, however, management has fiduciary obligations to
both creditors and shareholders. 2 A corporate insider who exerts ad-
verse influence upon a debtor breaches this fiduciary obligation, if not to
creditors then to shareholders,' 2' because the non-debtor would be serv-
Western Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600-01 (10th Cir. 1990), modified sub
nom. Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (1991). There is danger, however, that courts may not
view the claim of indemnification as pre-petition debt. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays,
supra note 96, at 250-51 n.134. The Third Circuit in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville
Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1160
(1985), held that a non-contractual claim for indemnification was a post-petition claim.
See id at 337. A court that treats a claim for indemnification as a post-petition claim
would in effect be granting the guarantor a priority claim or creating a non-dischargeable
claim in the bankruptcy reorganization. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at
250-51 n.134. This would place the guarantor's claim against the debtor in a superior
position than the claim of the creditor. Several courts, however, have rejected Frenville
and have held that a claim for indemnification is a pre-petition claim. See In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Baldwin-United Corp. v.
Named Defendants (In re Baldwin-United Corp.), 48 B.R. 901, 903 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985). Courts that view claims for indemnification as pre-petition claims are on "surer
footing" with Congressional intent. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 250-
51 n.134.
Moreover, in a case decided under the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court found that
a discharge in bankruptcy releases the debtor from all provable claims. See Williams v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1915). In addition, a surety
has a "provable claim" against the debtor although at the time of bankruptcy there may
have been no default. See iad This holding supports the view that a claim for indemnifi-
cation is indeed a pre-petition claim and therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy. Section
509(a) contemplates subrogation of the surety to the rights of creditors to the extent that
the surety has paid the creditor. See Huddelston, 1991 WL 110209 at *5. In the event of
subrogation, § 509(a) does not require that a priority status be afforded to the surety even
where the creditor to whom payment was made enjoyed such status. See id.
Subrogating the non-debtor to a non-priority status even when the non-debtor's claim
of indemnification may be entitled to priority status is consistent with the provisions of
the Code. Section 507(d) provides that a subrogee of a priority creditor is not entitled to
the priority status that the creditor enjoyed. See Woerner v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins.
Co. (In re Woerner), 19 B.R. 708, 711-12 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
118. See Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 25 B.R.
1018, 1022 (D.N.M. 1982).
119. See id.
120. See Martin J. Bienenstock, Bankruptcy Reorganization 72 (1987).
121. See Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corpo-
rate Structure, 25 UCLA L.Rev. 738, 760 (1975). Professor Grey notes, "Fiduciary du-
ties... simply oblig[e] the fiduciary to act in the best interests of his client or beneficiary
and to refrain from self-interested behavior." Id.
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ing its own interests"2 above those of the shareholders."z
Courts holding that non-debtor guarantors may be discharged in a
plan of reorganization tend to ignore the rationale behind guaranties. 24
The purpose of a guaranty is to ensure that the creditor can collect from
the guarantor if the debtor is unable to repay. 25 A less credit-worthy
company may require a guarantor in order to secure adequate financing.
The availability of the guaranty may reduce the cost of credit because the
interest rate on loans will decrease as the risk of default decreases.126
Moreover, the ability to use guaranties of principals or corporate of-
ficers may actually benefit a company. Guarantors will presumably only
be willing to guarantee financing if the proposed transaction has a rea-
sonable chance of success. Guaranties operate as a "filtering mechanism
that will enable the corporate debtor to avoid ventures in which the risks
outweigh potential benefits.' 127 Therefore, guaranties benefit a debtor
corporation by enabling the debtor to obtain less expensive financing for
transactions that have a reasonable chance of success. 2 s "[F]rom the
point of view of both the corporate debtor and the guarantor, as well as
from their respective creditors' points of view, guaranties are worth
protecting.9 12
9
Courts that allow for the discharge of guarantors in a plan of reorgani-
zation do serious damage to the effectiveness of guaranties in general. In
the long run, these courts may actually harm debtor corporations by in-
creasing the cost of financing and decreasing its availability. Further, by
removing this "filtering mechanism," such courts may unwittingly in-
crease the number of risky transactions. While trying to assist present
bankrupt debtors, these courts may be creating a business environment
where corporations that may have been able to otherwise survive with
lower interest rates and sounder business ventures are forced into
bankruptcy.
122. If the debtor pays the creditor, the insider guarantor will be relieved of its
obligations.
123. A corporate insider that unduly influences a debtor to pay off a debt, for which
the insider would otherwise be liable, will be diminishing the debtor's estate to the detri-
ment of the shareholders for its own benefit.
124. See Robin M. Goldman, Guarantee Agreementxr The Impact of Bankruptcy, 3
Prob. & Prop., May/June 1989, at 17, 19. As one court noted, "(W]hat good is a [guar-
anty] if the guarantor escapes liability when the debtor does?" Bel-Ken Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership v. Clark, 83 B.R. 357, 359 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988).
125. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 236. The recent onslaught of
bankruptcy filings has forced lenders to increasingly turn to guarantors for repayment. A
lender will view a non-bankrupt guarantor as a secondary source of collection. The
lender's expectation that it will be able to collect from the guarantor is frustrated, how-
ever, where bankruptcy courts discharge the guarantor's obligations to the lender. See id.
at 227; Tilton & Wild, supra note 1, at 5.
126. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 238. Indeed, one solution to the
infirmities of insider-guarantees with respect to preferential transfers is to impose higher
interest rates on the debtor. See Efros, supra note 97, at 799.
127. Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 239.
128. See id
129. Id
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b. Joint Tortfeasors- Undermining the Policy Behind Joint and
Several Liability
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has argued that
non-debtor discharges which abrogate the tort liability of third parties
undermines the policies underlying joint and several liability. 130 The un-
derlying rationale is to ensure that victims are fully compensated by the
remaining wrongdoers if one of the wrongdoers is unable to pay. 13  Ac-
cordingly, an officer or director is individually liable for his or her own
tortious conduct, even though such conduct may have arisen in the
course of the company's operation and in furtherance of the company's
interests. 132
Discharging non-debtors from potential tort liability is a dangerous
policy to follow. Officers and directors of corporations, who may be cul-
pable along with the debtor for a particular tortious act, may be able to
evade liability by causing the debtor to file for bankruptcy under Chapter
11. In fact, in the two largest mass-tort cases, A.H. Robins Co. and
Johns-Manville Corp., allegations arose that the companies, being sol-
vent, inappropriately filed for protection under Chapter 11 due to a de-
sire on the part of the corporate managements to limit liability. 133 In
both instances, the respective courts held that insolvency is unnecessary
at the time of filing; rather, if a company can foresee insolvency, it need
not wait until the company is actually insolvent to file. 131 Practically, it
may be reasonable to allow a solvent company to file for bankruptcy, but
this policy together with the policy of permitting discharge of a non-
debtor's liability are ill-conceived given the obvious potential for
abuse. 135
130. See SEC Brief, supra note 2, at 7.
131. See Sobol, supra note 64, at 334. Richard Sobol also suggests that, at least in the
case of A.H. Robins, relieving the potential co-defendants was not only violative of
§ 524(e) but also unnecessary to protect the debtor's estate because under Virginia law, a
duty to indemnify does not apply if the need for indemnification arises from willful mis-
conduct. Such misconduct had been found to exist in relation to the Dalkon Shield. See
id. at 385 n.21.
132. See Inforex, Inc. v. Burridge (In re Inforex, Inc.), 26 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1983).
133. See Sobol, supra note 64, at 327; Beckham, supra note 68, at 788 n.60.
134. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Sobol,
supra note 64, at 327 (noting that the bankruptcy court in both A.H. Robins and Johns-
Manville permitted the companies to file although neither was technically insolvent).
Sobol points out that many parties filed petitions to dismiss the bankruptcy petition on
the grounds that A.H. Robins was able to withstand the Dalkon Shield liability without
resorting to bankruptcy. The company's Chapter 11 petition was alleged to be a tactic to
consolidate all of the Dalkon Shield cases before a judge in the Eastern District of
Virginia who supposedly was more sympathetic to the Richmond company's plight. See
id.
135. Cf Sobol, supra note 64, at 331 (noting that where bankruptcy proceedings wipe
out claims for punitive damages, as in A.H. Robins, there is a "strong incentive for misuse
of Chapter 11").
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2. The Contributing Non-Debtor Theory
The "contributing non-debtor" theory 36 of third party dicharges
maintains that a discharge of a non-debtor's liability is appropriate where
the non-debtor contributes to the debtor's reorganization."3 " A discharge
in bankruptcy, however, is effective by operation of law, not by con-
tract. 138 Therefore, any payment made by a non-debtor to a debtor's
plan of reorganization, for purposes of securing a discharge, is not con-
sideration for a release.1 39 Many of the courts, that have premised third-
party releases on the "contributing non-debtor" theory have emphasized
the adverse effect on the debtor or the debtor's estate if the party making
such a contribution were not discharged.1"
Assets or proceeds that a non-debtor is not legally obligated to pay to
the debtor are not property of the debtor's estate under section 541141
and should not be subject to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.14 2 As
one bankruptcy court has stressed, "To hold that the bankruptcy court
136. See Shapiro, supra note 11, at 347; Tilton & Wild, supra note 1; see also Sobol,
supra note 64, at 221-22 (noting that, in the case of the A.H. Robins Co., the chairman of
the board and the president and CEO, both of whom allegedly committed tortious acts,
made a combined payment of $10 million to a claimants' trust in exchange for release of
liability and injunction against suits in connection with the Dalkon Shield).
137. See eg., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir.) (calling the contributions of non-debtor insurance company a
"cornerstone" of reorganization), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1988); Myerson & Kuhn v.
Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 157 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (failure to permanently enjoin suits against contributing non-debtor
would significantly diminish the total assets of the debtor's estate); UNARCO Blooming-
ton Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R 268, 278 (N.D. IM. 1990) (section
524(e) does not prohibit discharge of a third party where the reorganization "'hinges
on' "the release of a contributing non-debtor); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust
(In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 25 B.R. 1018, 1020-21 (D.N.M. 1982) (an aspect to be consid-
ered was that enforcement of a state court order against the debtor's president, who in-
tended to contribute to the reorganization, would affect the reorganization).
138. See Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985); Union Carbide
Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Scranes, Inc., 67 B.R. 985,
989 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
139. See Underhill, 769 F.2d at 1432; Union Carbide, 686 F.2d at 595; Scranes, 67 B.R.
at 989.
140. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694,701-02 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); Johns-Manville, 837 F.2d at 93; Myerson & Kuhn,
121 B.R. at 157; Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21
B.R. 777, 779 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982).
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988) ("legal or equitable interests ... in property" for
debtor are considered property of the estate).
142. See Bill Roderick Distrib. Inc. v. A.J. MacKay Co. (In re AJ. MacKay), 50 B.R.
756, 762 (D. Utah 1985); cf. Apollo Molded Prods., Inc. v. Kleinman (In re Apollo
Molded Prods., Inc.), 83 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) ("fT]he intentions of a
debtor's principal to devote personal assets to the reorganization should [not] ... have
the talismatic effect of shielding him from suit on his personal obligations."); In re El-
sinore Shore Assocs., 91 B.R1 238, 254 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1988) (bankruptcy court may
properly invoke its jurisdiction when "creditors' actions may effect property of the
[debtor's] estate"). The bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over property lapses when that
property leaves the estate. See Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis. Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.),
813 F.2d 127, 131 (7th Cir. 1987). Therefore, it is inconceivable that a bankruptcy court
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.. has jurisdiction over... any property that might 'assist' the debtor in
reorganizing is to expand jurisdiction beyond limit. Jurisdiction exists
only over the debtor and his property, and no further." '43 Indeed, in
ruling that the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction does not extend to the
non-debtor's assets, one court noted its belief that Otero Mills and its
progeny were wrongly decided because the bankruptcy court only has
authority to exert jurisdiction over the debtor and the debtor's
property. "
Moreover, with respect to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, it is ir-
relevant that an assertion of a claim against a non-debtor will adversely
affect the debtor's reorganization. 45 Courts that place the debtor's sur-
vival above that of the creditor's right to full payment ignore the implicit
mandate of the Code's absolute priority rule 46 that the creditor's right to
full payment is superior to creating value for the shareholders. 47
3. "Undivided Attention" and "Throw-In the Towel" Theories
The "undivided attention" theory 4 ' maintains that it is appropriate
for a court to invoke its equitable powers under section 105(a) to protect
a non-debtor whose participation is required for the debtor's reorganiza-
tion where claims against the non-debtor impinge upon that non-debtor's
participation in the bankrupt's reorganization efforts. The "undivided
attention" theory is more applicable to stays than to permanent injunc-
could expand its jurisdiction over property that was never previously a part of the
debtor's estate.
143. A.J. Mackay Co., 50 B.R. at 762; see also ElsinoreAssoc., 91 B.R. at 255 (quoting
A.J. Mackay).
144. See A.J. Mackay Co., 50 B.R. at 762; see also Venture Properties, Inc. v. Norwood
Group, Inc. (In re Venture Properties), 37 B.R. 175, 177 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984) (noting
that Otero Mills was wrongly decided); supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Otero Mills).
145. See United States v. Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986);
cf Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 228 n.50 (in response to a view that an
underlying goal of bankruptcy is to keep the debtor company afloat so that it may provide
its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and generate returns for shareholders, Prof.
Barry Zaretsky points out that one commentator maintains that "the notion of keeping
firms in business is not a bankruptcy policy" and the firm should only be kept afloat if it
maximizes the return to creditors and shareholders (citation omitted)).
146. The absolute priority rule is codified at § 1129(a)(8) of the Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(8) (1988). The absolute priority rule "prevents any distribution to the share-
holders unless the plan of reorganization provides for all the payment of the corporation's
debts." Sobol, supra note 64, at 52.
147. By keeping the debtor afloat at the expense of the creditors, the bankruptcy court
is necessarily creating value for the debtor's shareholders while impairing the claims of
creditors. A bankruptcy court's emphasis should be on protecting the debtor for the
benefit of the creditors and not protecting the debtor for the debtor's own benefit. See
Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 228.
148. See Bienenstock, supra note 120, at 110-11 n.29; Shapiro, supra note 11, at 347;
Harris, supra note 103, at 293; Tilton & Wild, supra note 1. But see Zaretsky, Co-Debtor
Stays, supra note 96, at 230 ("Bankruptcy court is simply not an appropriate forum for
stopping the clock on a principal's life in an effort to retain his undivided energy and
attention.").
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tive relief. Indeed, a temporary stay may be appropriate where the non-
debtor's energy and attention is required to assist the debtor through a
crucial point in the reorganization proceedings. 149 By its very nature,
however, a stay is temporary and will expire according to the terms of
the stay or upon confirmation of the plan. 5° Most courts, at least with
respect to guarantors, have refused to discharge a non-debtor to facilitate
the non-debtor's participation in the reorganization of the debtor.'
A more pressing issue arises when an officer or director threatens to
"throw in the towel"-by abandoning the debtor's attempts to reorgan-
ize-in the event that the court refuses to discharge the non-debtor of-
ficer or director.5 2 There is little reason, however, to succumb to such
threats. When the debtor is the officer's best employment opportunity,
the officer will stay regardless of whether the discharge is granted.5 3 In
the event the officer leaves the debtor to work elsewhere, the officer's
liability will be unaffected by his or her departure from the debtor" 4 and
may even grow.
Officers may, in certain circumstances, act irrationally or may desire to
avoid the turmoil of reorganization proceedings. The only effective in-
centive for the officer to remain with the debtor may be the discharge of
his or her liabilities. Does a discharge of the officer under such circum-
stances serve the purposes of equity? Bribing a corporate officer with a
discharge in order to secure that officer's assistance in a reorganization,
when that officer presumably played a role in the debtor's financial de-
mise, is not an equitable solution particularly when such discharge will
impair the rights or claims of creditors. The officer's assistance may be
desirable and in certain circumstances necessary, but the threat, either
expressed or implied, of "throwing in the towel" is tantamount to extor-
tion, and an extortionist does not deserve equitable relief even if that
relief may benefit the debtor. In the words of one commentator, "The
courts cannot allow legal principles to be shaped by ultimatums from the
litigants."1 5 Moreover, a party seeking "equitable relief under [section]
105 should follow the equitable maxim 'he who seeks equity must do
149. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 250. Most courts distinguish
between a personal creditor of the non-debtor and creditors with a claim arising from the
debtor's operations. The consensus is that creditors with a personal claim not arising
from debtor's operation should be free from interference from the bankruptcy proceed-
ings. See i at 250 n.133.
150. See id at 231.
151. See id at 250 & n.133.
152. Se4 eg., In re Original Wild West Foods, Inc., 45 B.RL 202, 205, 208 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1984) (court relieved officer from statutory liability on debtor's trust fund
taxes where officer threatened to "throw in the towel" if not released).
153. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 272. Conversely, if the debtor is
not the officer's best employment opportunity, the officer will not remain with the debtor
even if he or she is discharged.
154. See id Professor Zaretsky states: "[Unless the officer irrationally intends to dis-
regard his own self-interest in favor of destroying the debtor, courts should treat threats
to 'throw in the towel' as nothing more than empty threats." Id
155. Sobol, supra note 64, at 335.
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equity.' "156
C. A Note on Insurance and Mass Tort Claims
Most courts assume that liability insurance proceeds 57 are property of
the debtor's estate.' 58 Where this is the case, these proceeds may become
available to "non-victim creditors." '159 This, however, would give trade
creditors a windfall because the insurance proceeds would not otherwise
be available to satisfy the claims of such creditors. 160 Although section
524(e) is not implicated where insurance proceeds are deemed property
of the estate, safeguards are necessary, preferably via statutory amend-
ments, to ensure that the intended beneficiaries of the insurance policy,
such as tort claimants, have priority with respect to these funds. 16  In
the two leading mass tort bankruptcies, A.H. Robins Co. and Johns-
Manville Corp., a fund was established upon which only tort claimants
could draw. 162
Where the proceeds of an insurance policy are not considered property
of the estate, the aggrieved parties may be able to proceed against the
insurance company, or in some instances, against the debtor, for the pur-
poses of establishing liability to enable victims to collect from the in-
156. Tilton & Wild, supra note 1.
157. A distinction has been made between insurance policies and insurance proceeds.
A debate has ensued as to whether proceeds from certain types of insurance policies are
property of the debtor's estate. See Beckham, supra note 68, at 786-87; Zaretsky, Insur-
ance Proceeds, supra note 63, at 385-86.
158. See Beckham, supra note 68, at 787; Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 63,
at 386.
159. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 63, at 398; Zaretsky, Co-Debtor
Stays, supra note 96, at 276. Non-victim creditors are creditors having a claim against the
debtor that did not arise from a tort committed by the debtor.
160. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 277; see also Beckham, supra
note 67, at 792-93 (noting that once an asset becomes property of the estate, it is distrib-
uted along with the other property of the estate according to the priority rules of bank-
ruptcy, and also noting that tort claimants are not within a priority group). The
prevalent view, though, is that liability insurance must be distributed out of the estate
directly to tort claimants. See id. at 797.
161. Theories that tort claimants are specifically entitled to the insurance proceeds
have been based on arguments that the proceeds are held in constructive trust for benefit
of the tort claimants, see Beckham, supra note 68, at 794; Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds,
supra note 63, at 398, and that insurance policies are third-party beneficiary contracts, see
Beckham, supra note 68, at 794. There is no assurance that the courts will accept these
theories. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 63 at 399; cf Beckham, supra note
68, at 794 (these theories are subject to state law interpretation).
162. See MacArthur v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d
89, 90-91 (2d Cir.) (insurance proceeds channeled to a settlement fund), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 868 (1988); Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Group (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 33 B.R. 254, 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Sobol, supra note 64, at 219 (section
6.06 of A.H. Robins' plan of reorganization provided for a contribution of unused insur-
ance proceeds as well as reduced insurance coverage to a claimants trust). But see, e.g.,
UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc. 124 B.R. 268, 279 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (insurance proceeds were not separate and distinct from the rest of debtor's
estate).
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surer. 163 In this context, the problem lies not with the ability to proceed
against the insurer, but with equitably distributing the proceeds of the
insurance policy among the claimants.'16 The insurer's liability is limited
by the terms of the policy, and if the amount of claims is great, the policy
most likely will not cover all claims.' 6 Moreover, the insurer, unlike a
guarantor, will not seek bankruptcy protection because of its limited lia-
bility 1 66 and, consequently, the equitable protection of the courts will be
unavailable to the third-party insurance company.' 67
Under this scenario, the insurance proceeds will be distributed under
non-bankruptcy law 68 and a race to the insurance proceeds may re-
sult.169 The potential for a race to the proceeds stems from the lack of an
adequate non-bankruptcy system to equitably distribute insurance pro-
ceeds17 Claimants who are unable to receive full compensation from
the limited pool of insurance proceeds will be restricted from obtaining
further, if any, satisfaction from the bankrupt tortfeasor.
Although the insurer does not come within the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court, when claims may exhaust the maximum policy limits,
the most equitable method of distribution would be to require the insurer
to pay the amount of the policy limit into a fund to be administered for
and distributed to claimants. Such a fund is not contemplated by the
Code 71 and cannot be established under section 105(a) because it would
not be effectuating any provision of the Code. Therefore, in order to
163. See Owaski v. Jet Florida Sys., Inc. (In re Jet Florida Sys., Inc.), 883 F.2d 970,
973 (1 lth Cir. 1989) (section 524(e) does not preclude a claimant from proceeding against
debtor if the ultimate goal is collection from debtor's insurer). Also, in states that allow
for direct action against insurers or where the claimant already has a judgment of liability
against the debtor, the claimant may proceed directly against the insurer when proceeds
are not deemed property of the estate. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 63,
at 383.
164. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 276.
165. See id
166. See Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 63, at 393-95.
167. See iL at 395. Professor Zaretsky notes that in this situation claimants will be
relegated to the non-bankruptcy doctrine of first in time, first in right. See id.
168. Cf Zaretsky, supra note 63, at 384 (the bankruptcy court has power to oversee
the distribution of insurance proceeds only to the extent that the proceeds are deemed
property of the debtor's estate).
169. One of the enumerated goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to avoid a creditors race
to the debtor's assets. See Zaretsky, Co-Debtor Stays, supra note 96, at 217; John J.
Lawson, Note, Creditors Bewarel A Guaranty May Not Be Such a Guarantee, 94 Dick. L
Rev. 157, 159 (1989). In the event insurance proceeds are not deemed part of the debtor's
estate, preventing a run on such proceeds would not fulfill this goal of the Code because
the funds in question would be assets of a party other than the debtor.
170. See Zaretsky, supra note 63, at 393.
171. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-559, 1101-1174 (no provision of the Code applicable to, or
included in, Chapter 11 provides for treatment of insurance proceeds in bankruptcy); cf
Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds, supra note 63, at 386, 398-99 (noting the Code does not
provide for insurance proceeds to be included in the estate and, if proceeds are deemed
property of the estate, there is no guaranty that courts would recognize the theory that
the funds are held in constructive trust for the tort claimants).
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permit such a distribution, Congress must revise the Code so as to pro-
vide for such an insurance trust.
CONCLUSION
The language of section 524(a) provides that a discharge is personal to
a debtor, and section 524(e) precludes such discharge from affecting the
liability of any entity other than the debtor. Consequently, a discharge is
only available to those parties that file for protection under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, thereby submitting to its burdens as well as receiving its
benefits. This interpretation of section 524(e) is consistent with the con-
gressional mandate that the Code be applied to the relationship between
debtors and others, not between creditors and non-debtors. Courts have,
however, invoked section 105(a) to circumvent the provisions of section
524.
Discharges of non-debtors under section 105(a) must cease. They are
not only violative of the express command of section 524 but are also
contrary to public policy. Furthermore, The policies and rationales
enunciated by these courts to support the broad equitable powers of the
bankruptcy court do not comport with equitable principles or sound
business policies.
Although section 524 operates to prohibit discharges of non-debtors,
Congress should enact legislation to permit equitable distribution of pro-
ceeds from the debtor's insurance policies. Such legislation would ensure
that the proceeds are channeled in an even-handed manner to the ag-
grieved parties and not distributed as part of the debtor's estate in gen-
eral. Also, amending the Code to grant the bankruptcy court power over
insurance proceeds would settle any doubt as to whether these proceeds
are part of the bankrupt's estate, and forestall any possibility of a race to
these funds in the event there are multiple claimants.
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